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1.  Introduction
The Information Technology Division (ITD)
of the University of Michigan provides a
wide range of computing resources to its
users, several of which include security ser-
vices. To facilitate access control and
accounting for the use of these resources, a
single security service is needed that covers
a wide range of the provided computing
resources. Kerberos IV1 is ITD’s security ser-
vice of choice and is deployed on all IFS2cli-
ent machines. Yet, NetWare 4.0,3 an increas-
ingly popular choice in the University’s
information technology environment, uses
its own security service, one that is incom-
patible with Kerberos.
In this paper, we examine the feasibility of a
single login for the Kerberos and NetWare
security realms. By single login, we mean
that from any platform a user types one user
name/pass phrase4 pair to obtain access to
all services in the computing environment.
1.  Throughout the remainder of this paper, non-spe-
cific references to Kerberos refer to the version of Ker-
beros IV in AFS 3.x.
2.  The Institutional File System, based on AFS, is
deployed by ITD.
3.  Throughout the remainder of this paper, references
to NetWare refer to NetWare 4.0.
4.  Because “password” often connotes a dictionary
word, we choose to use the more general term, “pass
phrase.”
We approached this problem with the fol-
lowing design goals:
• A single client login program to give the
user access to both Kerberos and Net-
Ware services, using a single user name
and pass phrase for DOS/WINDOWS cli-
ents.
• No changes to Kerberos.
• Compatibility with existing NetWare
applications and services.
• No reduction in security due to the single
login, in either security realm.
The notion of single login holds implications
from both the client and security server
point of view. Since a user in both realms
enters the same pass phrase, client security
issues in both realms are merged. On the
server side, the pass phrase data bases of the
two realms are now related; this relationship
determines the server side exposure in-
curred by each realm due to the single login.
The goal of this paper is to understand the
implications of these mergers, and to pro-
pose a satisfactory design.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. In the first section, we give a short
overview of Kerberos and NetWare security
services. The second section lists some
known current security lapses in the two se-
curity realms, organized by attacks. The
third section discusses security lapses that
might be caused by single login. The fourth
section presents two single login designs. In
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the last section, we describe our conclusion,
and discuss ways to increase the level of se-
curity of the single login.
2.  Overview of Security Services
We assume the reader is familiar with Ker-
beros and NetWare security realms, and of-
fer the following overview.
2.1  Kerberos IV
Kerberos [1] is a trusted third-party
authentication service based on the challenge-
response model of Needham and Schroeder
[2]. Each client trusts Kerberos’ judgement
as to the identity of each of its other clients.
Kerberos keeps a database of its clients,
which it calls principals, and their keys. The
key is referred to as a symmetric key because
the same key is used for both encryption
and decryption of data. Because the
kaserver5 knows these keys, it can create
messages that convince one principal that
another is who it claims to be. The kaserver
also generates temporary secret keys, called
session keys, which can be used for authen-
tication or privacy of two parties.
Login proceeds as follows. The user is
prompted for a uniqname6. Once it has been
entered, a request is sent to the kaserver
containing the uniqname and the name of a
special service known as the ticket-granting
service. If the client is known to the
kaserver, a random session key and a
“ticket” for the ticket-granting server is
returned. This ticket contains information
such as the uniqname, the name of the
ticket-granting server, the current time, a
lifetime for the ticket, the client’s IP address,
and the random session key just created.
This is all encrypted in a key known only to
Kerberos and the ticket-granting server,
making the contents of the ticket
unknowable to others.
5.  In AFS, the Kerberos database is managed by a pro-
gram called kaserver.
6.  Uniqname is a University of Michigan program that
ensures that user-assigned logins are unique campus
wide, regardless of platform.
The kaserver then sends the ticket, a copy
of the random session key, and some other
information back to the client all encrypted
in the user’s key. Once this response has
been received by the client, the user is
prompted for a pass phrase. The pass
phrase is converted into a DES key and used
to decrypt the response. The ticket and the
session key along with some other informa-
tion are stored and used for background au-
thentication7. The user’s pass phrase and
DES key are erased from memory. The
cleartext pass phrase is never transmitted
over the network.
Some Kerberos weaknesses are described by
Bellovin and Merritt [3].
2.2  NetWare Authentication
NetWare Core Protocol (NCP) authentica-
tion uses RSA Data Security, Inc’s MD-4
Message-Digest Algorithm [4]. This algo-
rithm uses mutual authentication: each end
of a connection verifies its identity to the op-
posite end, in contrast to the trusted third
party authentication method of Kerberos.
The RSA cryptosystem uses a public/pri-
vate key pair where the public key is used
to encrypt data, and the private key to de-
crypt data. Since keys are not generated
from the users’ pass phrase, the NetWare
client must obtain the user’s private key
from NetWare Directory Service (NDS) at login.
Upon boot, the client agent responds either
to the nearest NDS tree broadcast, or to a
preferred NDS tree name stored in the local
file system, and connects to the service [5].
This connection lasts until reboot. As the
SITES8 are currently configured, the login
program is not stored locally in the client
file system, but resides on the server. The
client requests the login program at boot.
7.  The term background authentication refers to the
process of authenticating to a service by using some
cached credential derived from the user’s pass phrase,
obviating the need for the user to re-enter the pass
phrase.
8.  SITES is responsible for deployment of NetWare
for ITD on the University of Michigan campus.
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The login program sends the user’s login
name to the server, and receives the NDS
server’s public key and the user’s NDS User
ID (figure 1, steps 2-7). The server also sends
a four byte pseudorandom number as a
challenge.9 Note that these NCP requests
and responses are not authenticated with
MD-4 signatures, as the MD-4 state is not
initialized until after a successful login.
The client login creates a hash of the pass
phrase using the information it received
9.  We assume throughout this paper that any pseudo-
random number generator used by Kerberos or Net-
Ware is strong.
1. User supplies Uniqname and pass phrase
4. Requests server name
5. Receives server name
6. Requests server’s public key
7. Receives server’s public key
8. Requests user’s private key.
    Sends:
      • client random number,
      • hashed pass phrase, and
      • other information
    encrypted under server’s public key.
10. Client Workstation Decrypts User’s Private Key;
constucts signature and credential; and discards
private key
3. Receives User ID and
    server’s random number
NetWare
Directory
Services
Client 2.Requests login
9. Receives encrypted
private key
Figure 1. NetWare Authentication
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from the server. The client agent then gener-
ates a random four byte challenge and en-
crypts the hashed pass phrase, the server
challenge, and some other information with
the server’s public key and sends it all to the
server [4] (figure 1 step 8). The cleartext pass
phrase is never transmitted over the net-
work.
The server decrypts the packet using its pri-
vate key. Using information derived from
the pass phrase stored in NDS at pass
phrase creation, the user’s NDS ObjectID,
and the random number challenge it sent to
the client, the server repeats the hash calcu-
lation performed on the client and compares
the result with the hashed pass phrase re-
ceived from the client. If they prove to be
equal, the server has a high degree of confi-
dence that the agent submitting the hashed
pass phrase is the same agent that generated
the pass phrase derived information stored
in NDS [6]. In other words, the client’s abil-
ity to create the hashed pass phrase authen-
ticates the connection.
The NDS server, assured that the user’s
identity is as claimed, retrieves the user’s
private key, which is stored in NDS. The
server encrypts the private key along with
the challenge received from the client, and
sends it all to the client (figure 1 step 9). The
client agent decrypts the packet and com-
pares the received challenge with the one it
sent to the server. The client now has its pri-
vate key and can use MD-4 signatures in its
NCP exchanges.
The client uses the private key to encrypt a
credential, which is a user and session iden-
tification data structure, to create a signa-
ture. Once the signature is created, the
private key is erased from memory (figure 1
step 10). The signature never gets transmit-
ted over the network. Instead a “proof”, de-
rived from both the signature and message
data, is constructed and transmitted with
each request or message as the authenticator
[7]. The signature/proof mechanism is used
for background authentication.
NetWare does not provide a means for ap-
plications to use data encryption. Neither
the RSA public/private key pairs nor the
RSA encryption/decryption API are ex-
posed.
3.  Current Exposure Under Dual
Login
This section enumerates the methods to ob-
tain pass phrases or another user’s cyber-
space identity (i.e. keys) and examines the
response of both security realms to these at-
tacks.
3.1  User Responsibility
Any security system requires users to iden-
tify themselves to the system. Absent the
use of physical traits (e.g. retina scans), a
user needs to possess a secret to present to
the system, typically a pass phrase. The user
is responsible for guarding this secret. Users
need to pick good pass phrases and to
guard against “shoulder surfing” (allowing
others to watch them type in their pass
phrase). They should also avoid writing
pass phrases on paper or storing them
where others might find them.
One way to reduce the risk from shoulder
surfing and paper pass phrases is the use of
secure cards. These cards produce a stream
of one-time pass phrases using a seed
known only to the card and the security
server. Since physical possession of the card
is required to log in, theft is more difficult
and more easily detected. There is currently
no support for the use of secure cards in ei-
ther Kerberos or NetWare.
3.2  Corrupt Administrators
A dishonest system or network administra-
tor is in a good position to steal pass
phrases. The system is only as trustworthy
as the people who run it.
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3.3  Trusted Servers
Both Kerberos and NetWare require that
their server machines be kept physically se-
cure. If an attacker gains access to server
machines, then she could collect pass
phrases, cause denial of service, or install
new or replacement programs, all of which
result in unpredictable and undesirable
server behavior. Therefore server machines
should be kept in locked room with access
limited to authorized staff.
3.4  Client Trojan Horse
Client machines are typically not physically
secure, which presents the opportunity to
install a program (a “Trojan horse”) that
steals user pass phrases. The most obvious
target of a Trojan horse attack is the login
program itself, but other targets should not
be overlooked. On some systems, it is
possible to install a “keyboard sniffer” that
records individual keystrokes, unknown to
users. Even seemingly benign application
programs can be used in a Trojan horse
attack, as they typically inherit all the user’s
permissions when they run. Naive users
may be duped into supplying a pass phrase
when a Trojan horse demands it, even if
there is no obvious need for the program to
have the pass phrase.
On UNIX clients, an attacker must boot the
system in single user mode or otherwise ob-
tain root permissions to access the local file-
system and install the Trojan horse. On the
other hand, Mac and PC clients have no lo-
cal filesystem access control, so a Trojan
horse is trivial to install. IFS clients consist of
all Transarc-supported UNIX clients, Macs,
and soon DOS/Windows PCs. There are
also unsupported copies of a cache manager
for OS/2. NetWare clients consist of DOS
and Windows PCs and Macs. Unless these
machines are physically secure, all are
equally open to client Trojan horse attacks.
Clients can be configured to automatically
“scrub,” i.e. re-install much of their soft-
ware, after each user logs out. This is time-
consuming but reduces the risk that a Trojan
horse planted on a client remains when the
next user logs in.
3.5  Promiscuous Access
There are products such as Network General’s
Sniffer and operating systems such as AIX
for the IBM RS/6000 that allow promiscuous
access to network traffic. In a large and di-
verse computing environment where it is
impossible to secure the network com-
pletely, we must assume that any traffic
may be sniffed. Sniffing provides the data
for spoofing, replay, and dictionary attacks.
Sniffing also allows for capturing any pass
phrases that are passed on the network in
the clear.
Several heavily used protocols place pass
phrases on the wire in cleartext. FTP
conveniently places the whole pass phrase
in one packet. TELNET generally places
each character of the pass phrase in a
separate packet. RLOGIN and some
versions of POP also place the pass phrase
on the wire in the clear. Any Kerberos or
NetWare user that uses these protocols
exposes her pass phrase to sniffing.
Pass phrases may be particularly vulnerable
to sniffing at the time they are set or
changed, as a new secret (pass phrase or
user key) must be generated by the client
and sent to the server. In Kerberos, the user
key is sent encrypted by a session key. In
NetWare, the hashed pass phrase is sent en-
crypted by the user’s public key.
3.6  Replay or Forged Packet
Replay attack consists of inserting a modi-
fied old packet into a privileged session in
order to grant rights to the intruder. A new
forged packet may also be used for this pur-
pose. Kerberos makes use of timestamps
and nonces, and NCP uses sequence num-
bers and the MD-4 message digest to mini-
mize replay and forged packet attacks.
3.7  Dictionary Attack
Dictionary attack consists of passing every
word in a dictionary as a possible pass
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phrase to a login or key generating program,
and verifying the results either by attempted
login or by comparing to the generated key.
The dictionary can contain the entire English
language, foreign languages, custom entries
composed of past pass phrases, user’s favor-
ite places, slang, etc. NetWare limits the
number of login attempts to hamper on-line
dictionary attack.
Kerberos IV is subject to an off-line diction-
ary attack of the TGT [3]. The attacker asks
for a TGT, claiming to be the victim. Ker-
beros returns a TGT encrypted in the vic-
tim’s key. Because some of the contents of a
TGT are well known (such as realm, and
uniqname), and the string-to-key functions
are public, a dictionary attack on the TGT
can be launched; furthermore, because the
attacker is in possession of the victim’s TGT,
the attack can be accomplished off-line. If
successful, the attacker discovers with the
victim’s key, which can be used to assume
the victim’s Kerberos identity.
This method works not only because the
form of the TGT is known, but also because
the victim’s key is formed from a pass
phrase. The more cryptic the pass phrase,
the less likely it is to be found in a diction-
ary. Kerberos session keys are derived from
pseudorandom numbers, so they are (pre-
sumably) immune to dictionary attack. Ker-
beros V prevents this attack through the use
of a pre-authentication step.
NetWare’s RSA public/private keys are
generated from pseudorandom numbers
and are stored under the protection of a pass
phrase. Pseudorandom keys are (presum-
ably) much stronger than Kerberos user
keys and so are immune to dictionary at-
tack.
There is a sophisticated off-line dictionary
attack on the NetWare protocol that spoofs
the NDS server to obtain the user’s hashed
pass phrase. The attacker uses a client and
the spoofed NDS server to obtain hashed
guessed pass phrases, which are compared
to the user’s hashed pass phrase.
In this scenario, the attacker constructs a
spoofing NDS server that responds to the
client’s initial connection exchange (figure 1
steps 2, 4, and 6), masquerading as a legiti-
mate NDS server. When a client makes an
NDS request, the spoofer generates a pub-
lic/private key pair and responds to the cli-
ent with a User ID (a 32-bit number), a
random challenge, and the generated public
key (figure 1 steps 3, 5, and 7). The client
then sends the hash of the user’s pass
phrase encrypted under this public key (fig-
ure 1 step 8). The fake server obtains the
hash of the user’s pass phrase by decrypting
the packet with the private key.
Now an off-line dictionary attack proceeds
as follows. The attacker uses a client to talk
to the spoof server off-line, feeding it possi-
ble pass phrases. The spoof server responds
with the same User ID and random chal-
lenge that it provided to the client, gathers
the generated hash of the guessed pass
phrase, and compares it to the hash of the
user’s pass phrase, collected from the client
above. A match means that the user’s pass
phrase has been discovered.
This attack requires detailed knowledge of
NCP and SAP (NetWare’s advertising pro-
tocol) as well as an RSA public/private key
engine.
3.8  Spoofing
Spoofing is pretending to be a server or a
peer. Kerberos is immune to spoofing at-
tacks as long as the servers are physically
secure and their /etc/srvtab files are un-
available. The NetWare NDS server can be
spoofed. We have identified two attacks that
use an NDS spoof server.
SITES runs its public NetWare clients with
guest login only; client login is kept on the
NDS server. At boot, NetWare clients
connect to the nearest advertised (by
broadcast) NDS tree. If the client login is not
local, the first thing the client does is to
import the login program from the NDS
server. An NDS spoof server can be on the
local LAN. If its load is minimal, it can
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easily be the first to respond to a client’s
connection request and provide a Trojan
horse login program to gather pass phrases.
This provides the attacker with a distributed
client Trojan horse.
If the client login is local, the intruder’s NDS
can respond to the client’s login program’s
requests (User ID, server public key, ran-
dom number, etc.) and receive the client’s
hashed pass phrase. The hashed pass phrase
can then be dictionary attacked off line, as
described above. This spoof/dictionary at-
tack requires intimate knowledge of Net-
Ware’s NCP and SAP protocols, as well as
the ability to generate RSA keys and use
them for encryption/decryption.
Both these spoofs depend on the ability to
spoof the initial client connection to the de-
sired NDS tree.
3.9  Summary of Exposures
Both security realms contain lapses that al-
low an attacker to obtain pass phrases. Both
realms share the protocol sniffing and local
client Trojan horse security lapses, and each
realm is open to a dictionary attack.
Kerberos exposures include:
• Sniff FTP, TELNET, or RLOGIN protocols
to obtain pass phrases.
• Install client Trojan horse.
• Ask for a TGT and dictionary attack it off-
line.
NetWare security exposures include:
• Sniff FTP, TELNET, or RLOGIN protocols
to obtain pass phrases.
• Install client Trojan horse.
• Spoof as NDS and distribute Trojan horse
to clients.
• Spoof as NDS and gather hashed pass
phrases; dictionary attack off-line to
obtain pass phrase.
4.  Additional Exposure Due To
Single Login
Creating a single login creates additional
client- and server-side exposured issues as
described below.
4.1  Client-Side Issues
Kerberos and NetWare security realms are
equally open to client Trojan horse attacks.
Combining the realms exposes Kerberos
pass phrases to the NetWare distributed cli-
ent Trojan horse spoof, and so hampers the
current Kerberos security. The distributed
client Trojan horse exposure can be removed
by providing local login programs to all
SITES NetWare clients. An attacker can still
install Trojan login programs, but must visit
each client individually to do so.
4.2  Server-Side Issues: Pass Phrase Data
Base Relationships
At ITD, we use Kerberos to authenticate to
many services, so we view the Kerberos pass
phrase data base as the master database and
NetWare NDS as the slave. Thus, the Ker-
beros data base will not change; the Net-
Ware data base will. Given this decision, the
design question becomes what NetWare
pass phrase will be presented to NDS and
how it is related to the Kerberos pass
phrase. Note that we are not talking about
what pass phrase the user presents to the cli-
ent; that will be the Kerberos pass phrase.
Rather, we are talking about what goes on
behind the scenes. There are three possibili-
ties:
• NetWare pass phrase is the same as the
Kerberos pass phrase
• NetWare pass phrase is derived from the
Kerberos pass phrase.
• NetWare pass phrase is unrelated to the
Kerberos pass phrase.
In the first case, where the same pass phrase
is used in each realm, each realm’s security
is now dependent upon the other. The abil-
ity to compromise either system and obtain
a pass phrase means that both systems are
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compromised. In the next section, we de-
scribe a candidate architecture that uses this
scheme.
Carnegie Mellon University’s NetWare AFS
Project [8] proposes a single login solution
of the second variety: the NetWare pass
phrase is derived from the Kerberos client’s
key. Security in the NetWare realm depends
on Kerberos but Kerberos security is only
partially dependent upon the NetWare
realm: compromising NetWare and obtain-
ing the NetWare pass phrase exposes the
Kerberos client key, which is less of a secu-
rity threat than losing the Kerberos pass
phrase.
In the third case, the NetWare pass phrase is
unrelated to the Kerberos pass phrase. In the
next section, we describe a candidate archi-
tecture that maintains a data base of Net-
Ware pass phrases encrypted under user
Kerberos keys. In that design, the NetWare
pass phrase gives no access to the Kerberos
security realm, while the Kerberos pass
phrase gives complete access to the Net-
Ware security realm.
Another potential scheme would be to gen-
erate a new random NetWare pass phrase
for each login, forcing a pass phrase change
in NDS. In this scheme, obtaining a pass
phrase in one realm gives no access to the
other realm, but this seems to be quite
clumsy. Since the user does not know her
NetWare pass phrase, unmodified NetWare
client login will not work.
5.  Single Login Designs
We describe two single login designs, noting
their respective advantages and disadvan-
tages.
5.1  Common Pass Phrase
In this design, the same pass phrase is used
for both Kerberos and NetWare security
realms. Users are allowed to change their
Kerberos pass phrases freely, while ACL’s
on the User Object in NDS prevent them
from changing their NetWare pass phrases
directly. The NDS pass phrase is synchro-
nized with the Kerberos pass phrase at the
next client login as described below. The
Kerberos and NetWare pass phrase data
bases are then kept in synchrony until a
pass phrase change.
There are two components to this design,
S1_LOGIN.EXE, a new NetWare PC client
login program, and NW_AUTH.NLM. This
NLM10 runs on NDS servers, and is a
Kerberos service provider with NDS
administration privileges that performs the
pass phrase synchronization.
S1_LOGIN.EXE chains together normal Ker-
beros and NetWare login, gathering Ker-
beros tickets and NetWare credentials. After
obtaining the uniqname and pass phrase
from the user, Kerberos tickets are obtained
in the usual way, and NetWare login is at-
tempted (figure 2). If the data bases are syn-
chronized, this succeeds and S1_LOGIN.EXE
returns.
Figure 2. Common Pass Phrase Login: NDS
is synchronized with Kerberos
If NetWare login fails, S1_LOGIN.EXE uses
Kerberos to mutually authenticate with
NW_AUTH.NLM. This provides a session key
and a secure connection between the client
and NDS. The uniqname and pass phrase
are encrypted with the session key and sent
to NW_AUTH.NLM, which forces a pass phrase
change. The NetWare and Kerberos data
10.  NLM stands for NetWare Loadable Module.
PC Client
1. Kerberos login 2. NetWare login
Kerberos NW_AUTH.NLM NDS
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bases are now synchronized, and normal
NetWare login is tried again (figure 3).
Figure 3. Common Pass Phrase: NDS
change pass phrase. Kerberos pass
phrase has been changed, NDS
needs to be synchronized.
There are several advantages to this design.
S1_LOGIN.EXE uses normal NetWare login,
so a NetWare client login works “out of the
box.” If the user changes her Kerberos pass
phrase on an unmodified Kerberos client,
she does not run S1_LOGIN.EXE, and un-
modified NetWare clients will continue to
work with her old Kerberos pass phrase. Mi-
gration from NetWare-only to Kerberos+-
NetWare clients is accomplished by
installing the modified client software, obvi-
ating a “flag day.” The design also scales
well, as communication with NW_AUTH.NLM
occurs only upon a pass phrase change.
The major drawback to this design is that
NetWare and Kerberos security realms are
each forced to depend on the other’s ability
to protect the mutual pass phrase. Beyond
that, a pragmatic concern arises due to the
time-consuming nature of NDS synchroniz-
tion. In the unmodified NetWare API, pass
phrase change entails unsealing the public/
private key pair stored in NDS under a key
derived from the old pass phrase, and re-
sealing them under a key derived from the
new pass phrase. In our design, the old pass
phrase is not available at NDS synchroniza-
tion time, so the user’s public/private key
pair are no longer usable. Consequently, a
new key pair must be generated, which
PC Client
1. Kerberos login
3. Kerberos
authenticate
pass phrase
2. NetWare login fails
Kerberos NW_AUTH.NLM NDS
4. Change NetWare
5. NetWare login
takes significantly longer than does the un-
modified NetWare login.
5.2  Distinct Pass Phrase
In this design, the NetWare pass phrase and
the Kerberos pass phrase are unrelated, and
there is no synchronization between Ker-
beros and NetWare pass phrase data bases.
The user chooses Kerberos and NetWare
pass phrases at account creation time. The
Kerberos pass phrase is all that is needed to
perform single login. The chosen NetWare
pass phrase is stored in a NetWare pass
phrase data base and retrieved  by the single
login program to obtain NetWare creden-
tials.
Since NDS does not export pass phrases, it
cannot be used as the NetWare pass phrase
data base. This necessitates a modified Net-
Ware change pass phrase program that syn-
chronizes NDS with the NetWare pass
phrase data base. As in the common pass
phrase design, a user is not allowed to
change her NetWare pass phrase directly.
Instead, the modified pass phrase change
program communicates with the NetWare
pass phrase data base NLM, which performs
the NDS pass phrase change.
There are three components to this design
(figure 4):
• S2_LOGIN.EXE, a new NetWare PC client
login program,
• NETPASSD.NLM, a daemon that maintains
the NetWare pass phrase data base, and
• NEWPASS.EXE ,  a  modified NetWare
change pass phrase program
NETPASSD.NLM, which runs on NDS servers,
is a Kerberos service provider with NDS ad-
ministration privileges. It maintains a data
base of NetWare pass phrases indexed by
uniqnames. A global Kerberos DES key
known only to NETPASSD.NLM is used to en-
crypt all stored NetWare pass phrases.
S2_LOGIN.EXE chains together normal
Kerberos and NetWare login, gathering
Kerberos tickets and NetWare credentials.
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After obtaining the uniqname and Kerberos
pass phrase from the user, Kerberos tickets
are obtained in the usual way. Kerberos is
then used to mutually authenticate with
NETPASSD.NLM, providing a session key and
secure connection, which is used to retrieve
the NetWare pass phrase for the given
uniqname from the NetWare pass phrase
data base. The NetWare pass phrase is then
used in a normal NetWare login (figure 4).
Figure 4. Distinct Pass Phrase Login
NEWPASS.EXE is called by the user to change
the NetWare pass phrase. The user is required
to have run S2_LOGIN.EXE before running
NEWPASS.EXE. The user is prompted for her
uniqname, old NetWare pass phrase, and new
NetWare pass phrase.NEWPASS.EXE mutually
authenticates with NETPASSD.NLM and
establishes a secure connection for sending the
uniqname, old, and new NetWare pass phrases.
NETPASSD.NLM updates its data base and calls
the normal NetWare change pass phrase API
for NDS synchronization (figure 5).
Figure 5. Distinct Pass Phrase: NDS change
pass phrase. User must be logged
in via Distinct Pass Phrase login.
PC Client
1. Kerberos login
2. Kerberos
authenticate
pass phrase
4. NetWare login
Kerberos NETPASSD.NLM NDS
3. Retrieve NetWare
PC Client
1. Kerberos login
2. Change NetWare
Kerberos NETPASSD.NLM NDS
pass phrase
The major advantage to this design is that
given different NetWare and Kerberos pass
phrases, compromising the NetWare secu-
rity realm does not compromise the Ker-
beros security realm. Other advantages
include an easy migration path from Net-
Ware-only to Kerberos+NetWare clients.
Since unmodified NetWare clients will
work, modified client software can be in-
stalled as needed.
There are several disadvantages to this de-
sign. Since NDS doesn’t export pass
phrases, yet another data base needs to be
implemented, kept synchronized, and made
available, usually implying replication.
Communication with NETPASSD.NLM occurs
at each client login generating network traf-
fic and promoting scaling as an issue.
Users are also required to choose and re-
member two pass phrases. Many users will
choose to use the same pass phrase for both
realms, making moot the first advantage
cited above.
6.  Conclusion
We conclude that a merging the Kerberos
and NetWare security realms is feasible
without altering the security of either. Pass
phrase sniffing of FTP, TELNET, etc. proto-
cols remains a concern, as does the client
Trojan horse attack common to both secu-
rity realms. We suggest that the NetWare
client login program be a local executable,
removing the threat of the distributed client
Trojan horse spoof.
Dictionary attack of the Kerberos IV TGT
and the NetWare 4.0 hashed pass phrase re-
main a problem. In security realms that we
administer, we regularly attempt dictionary
attack on all accounts and disable accounts
whose pass phrase is thus revealed.
We feel that data put on the wire encrypted
by an NDS public or private key is at least
as safe as data put on the wire encrypted
with the Kerberos session key [9]. Both of
Center for Information Technology Integration 13
Joining Security Realms: A Single Login for NetWare and Kerberos
these keys are seeded with a random num-
ber, immunizing them from dictionary at-
tack.
We described two single login designs that
meet the remaining goals of giving user ac-
cess to both Kerberos and NetWare services
with no changes to Kerberos and compati-
bility with existing NetWare applications
and services.
The common pass phrase design is simple,
scales well, and seems to be easy to manage,
and is being deployed by ITD. We can raise
the security level of this design in several
ways. Encrypting the pass phrase sent to
NW_AUTH.NLM for NDS synchronization with
an RSA public key instead of (or in addition
to) the Kerberos session key might increase
the protection of the pass phrase. This
would require NetWare to expose RSA en-
cryption for data transfer. Authenticating
the initial client to NDS connection using
Kerberos would prevent NetWare server
spoofing.
The distinct pass phrase design is similar to
the single login design proposed by the DCE
Security SIG based on work done by Chii-
Ren of Citicorp [10]. The slave security
realm’s (e.g. NetWare) pass phrase is stored
under the master security realm’s (e.g. Ker-
beros) protection and retrieved automati-
cally at login. This design is extensible to
any number of slave security realms, and
has the additional advantage of allowing for
all pass phrases for all security services for a
single user to be different. ITD is investigat-
ing using such a scheme as part of a com-
plete data base architecture redesign effort.
ITD can increase the security level of its Ker-
beros service in several ways. Switching
from Kerberos IV to Kerberos V would ad-
dress the exposure to off-line dictionary at-
tack [3]. Deploying Kerberized TELNET and
FTP services would help eliminate cleartext-
pass phrases over the network. The use of
S/KEY [11], SECURE ID, or some other
one-time pass phrase scheme would reduce
or eliminate the exposure due to stolen pass
phrases.
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